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THE GREEK MILITARY REGIME (1967-1974) AND THE CYPRUS 

QUESTION -- ORIGINS AND GOALS* 
CONSTANTINE P. DANOPOULOS 
Ball State University 
Journal of Political and Military Sociology 1982, VoL 10 (Fall):257-273 
This article employs the concept of military professionalism and its 
attributes to explain the Greek praetorian regime's handling of the 
Cyrprus problem. Upon examining the relevant data it was found that for 
strategic considerations the U.S. and NATO sought to achieve a 
negotiated solution to the Cyprus problem which would have amounted 
to double Enosis. It was also found that professional needs created a 
dependency of the Greek military on NATO for arms, sophisticated 
training, and support which let them view participation in NATO as 
indespensab/e. As a result, the Greek military confused the interests of 
their nation with those of the Atlantic Alliance and sought to solve the 
Cyprus problem on the basis of NATO's interests even though such a 
solution went contrary to the national aspirations of Greece. 
Military professionalism 1 is considered by most students of contemporary 
civil-military relations as the most salient characteristic of modern military 
organizations. As such, a proliferatin~~ number of studies dealing with nations 
that have experienced praetorianism employ the concept of professionalism as 
a key variable affecting the behavior of the armed forces with respect to 
intervention and subsequent military rule. Other scholarly works deal with 
professionalism's impact on a host of other related concerns including the 
armed forces' ideological persuasions, organizational structure, and attitude 
toward human nature and politics. 
This intense scholar~1attentir,m displayed tmvard these concerns, however, 
cannot be matched with a general neglect of the impact of "bloc" or alliance 
oriented professionalism on the f0reign policy attitudes of the military of state 
members of such defense alliC~nces as NATO, ANZUS, and OAS. Bengt 
Abrahamsson pr6vides some thepretical support for this. He argues that the 
military perceive t11eml)elves as the sole guarantors of the physical, political, and 
moral integrity of their na.tion. But in order to be able to accomplish this mission 
* This paper is a much revised and condensed veJ;slon of chppter five of the author's doctoral 
dissertation titled "Soldiers in Politics: The Case of Contemporary Greece", University of Missouri­
Columbia, 1980. 
1 This paper uses Abral~amsson's (1972) ddiniti.ol~ O•f military professkmalism, which includes 
(a) spedalizled thE~oreticall~nowledge ,ac:companied b~• methods and devices for application; (b) 
respoi~sibilit;,~, groupded on a set oi ethical rules; and (c') a high degr.ee of corporateness deriving 
from ,common training and devotion t.:) sp~Jcifi~ dactrh1.e$. and customs. See his Military 
Professionalism and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sa.ge Publications), p. 15. 
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military organizations need arms, equipment, sophisticated training, and 
support which, for the most part, can only be provided by a relatively small 
number of developed states most of whom belong in such alliances. Thus, 
dependency for such essentials and concern for the security of their client, the 
state, (and by implication the professional interests of the military organization) 
prompt officers to view participation and adherence to the basic principles of a 
"common bloc" as "positive" and even indispensable for they strengthen "the 
position of each individual country against the common adversary." As such, 
they are considered "perfectly compatible" with the military's nationalistic 
attitudes. In short, concern for the security of the state, Abrahamsson 
concludes, " .. .is tranformed into favorable opinion of the defense community" 
(1972:83). 
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether alliance-oriented military 
professionalism and its attributes impact on the armed forces' foreign policy 
attitudes. This is to be accomplished by looking at the Colonels' -as the Greek 
military rulers became known - handling of the Cyprus Question which 
culminated in the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios in July 1974. The following 
pages will trace the historical components of the Cyprus problem leading up to 
the establishment of the Cypriot Republic in 1960; examine the developments 
occuring from the constitutional crisis of 1962 up to the 1967 coup-d'-etat, 
unfold the praetorian regime's Cyprus policy, and analyze the nature of that 
policy and assess the impact of Greece's membership in NATO on it.2 
A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW UNTIL 1967 
"The central fact of nation-building," says Reinhard Bendix, "is the orderly 
exercise of a nationwide public authority" which presupposes "agreement 
c~cerning the rules that are to govern the resolution of conflict" (1964:18-22). 
The island of Cyprus inhabited by about 80 percent Greek-Cypriots and about 
18 percent Turkish-Cypriots clearly does not fall in this category. The Greek­
Cypriots trace their Greekness as far back as the fourth-century B.C. The 
introduction of Christianity fastened this link and established a pervasive 
Church role in every aspect of Greek-Cypriot life. The Moslem Turkish­
Cypriots, meanwhile, view themselves as descendents of the Ottomans who 
occupied the island from 1573 to 1878 and see the modern state of Turkey as 
their mother country. But the barrier of religion kept the two communities apart 
and prevented the emergence of. a national Cypriot consciousness. This was 
also enhanced by the geographic location which rendered Cyprus an important 
2 This paper is partly based on a suvvey questionnaire consisting of thirty-one close-ended 
questions administered during the month of tvlay 198) to thirty-four offic~rs of the Greek Armed 
Forces on postgraduate training at the N<~val Postgraduate School in Monterey, C<!lifornia. Of the 
thirty-four officers or:ily eighteen bothered to return the questionnaire by mail as the author had 
requested. 
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refueling station for those who competed in this sensitive part of the world. The 
British, by virture of a temporary agreement with the Ottomans, were the last to 
gain the right to administer the island. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) formally 
added Cyprus to Her Majesty's colonial empire. 
However, the tides of anticolonialism that swept the world in the years 
following World War II touched the more economically and politically 
developed Greek-Cypriots. Led by the Church and the National Organization 
of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA}, they struggled for self-determination and Enosis 
(union with Greece). Citing strategic considerations, Britain initially sought to 
frustrate Greek-Cypriot airns by stimulating Turkish concerns regarding the 
fate of their copatriots on the island. Ankara began advocating T akshim 
(partition) as the only just solution and looked toward the U.S. and NATO for 
support. The Western Alliance responded advocating a solution to the Cyprus 
problem within the confines of NATO. Since NATO's military strategy is 
nothing more than "an extension of American strategy" made possible through 
"the massive infusion of American personnel, technology, and capital" 
(Fedder,1973: 12.5), the U.S.'s posture on th(: Cyprus matter became the official 
policy of the Atlantic Alliance as well--an ar~Jument strongly echoed in the 
Greek press (Carmocolias, 1981:229). 
After considerable pressure from the U.S. and elsewhere (T erlexis, 
1971:335), Greece joined Britain and Turkey in an effort to negotiate a solution 
to the Cvprus dispute. [n February 1959, it was announced in Zurich that a 
settlement was reached which the three "Guarantors" signed in London the 
following August Conspicuously absent from the negotiation were the 
representatives of the two Cypriot communities who after initial hesitation 
signed the accord. 
Briefly, the settlement consisted of three treaties and a draft constitution. 
The treaties established the island as a sovereign state, forbade either Enosis or 
partition, set out the terms of a military presence of both Greece and Turkey, 
and contained a provision whereby the three powers guaranteed the 
independence of the island. The constitutional structure established a 
biocommunal structure in aJI levels of government and life. The executive 
consisted of a Greek President and a Turkish Vice President elected separately 
by E~ach community, each of whom had veto power in matters of security and 
foreign affairs. En accordance with the s~ttlement the island became a republic in 
Au!;iust 1960, with Makarios as President and Fazil Kuchuk as Vice President. 
The imposed settlement ran iinto difficulties. The nature of the 
constitutional structure along with the mistrust each comrnunity harbored 
toward the diff!Brences in the level of economic development stalemated the 
central government. On November 3, 196B, President Makarios sought to 
break the impasse. He submitted a ~'thitteen point" plan aimed at amending key 
sections of the constitution, but the Turkish side rejected it. The dismissal of the 
plan shattered the uneasy cakn that prevailed on the island for the past three 
years, and rumors of an imminent Turkish invasion spread. Meanwhile Vice 
President Kuchuk and the three Turkish C51priot ministers resigned in protest, 
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leading to a virtual isolation of their community that lasted until July 1974. 
Fearing that the tense situation in Cyprus could quickly spread to a wider 
conflict involving Greece and Turkey, the U.S. applied pressure to have a 
NATO-sponsored peace-keeping force restore order. President Makarios, 
however, rejected the idea, thus leaving the U.N. Security Council adopted a 
resolution recommending that a U.N. peace-keeping force be sent to restore 
the peace. The Cypriot Government consented and a force of 7,000 men 
(UNFICYP) has been stationed on the island ever since. Under UNFICYP 
auspices a semblance of peace was restored, but the schism between the two 
communities widened and return to the London-Zurich framework became 
highly problematic (Coufoudakis, 1976b). In Athens the new Centrist 
government of George Papandreou appeared more sympathetic to the 
Archbishop's view than did its predecessor, and it secretly strengthened the 
Greek contingent on the island. Makarios sought and received Moscow's 
support. Thus, Makarios' and Papandreous' "common line" of opposing 
bilateral negotiations and seeking a U.S. solution won some badly needed 
support. 
Washington, however, had very little patience with a U.N. approach and 
even less sympathy for Makarios' independent foreign policy positions. 
President Johnson applied pressure on Greece and Turkey to solve the Cyprus 
problem through bilateral negotiations and in July 1964 invited the Prime 
Ministers of the two countries for separate consultations. The Turkish leader 
offered no basic objections, but Papandreou, in spite of Johnson's arm twisting, 
refused to abandon the U.N. road. To help mediate the impasse, the American 
president summoned former Secretary of State Dean Acheson who presented 
what became known as the "Acheson Plan". Basically, the scheme called for 
Enosis of Cyprus with Greece, but in return Turkey was to receive the small 
Aegean island of Kastellorizon and maintain a military base and two Turkish 
cantons on the island. In effect, the Acheson Plan amounted to partition or, one 
may say, double-Enosis. Ankara seemed favorably disposed toward the plan 
but Makarios denounced it as totally unacceptable. Papandreou at first 
accepted the plan but later, succumbing to pressure .from his son Andreas and 
Archbishop Makarios, rejected it. 
The new goyernment of Stephanos Stephanopoulos that replaced 
Papandreou's seemed more amenable to the Acheson Plan and appeared 
willing to proceed with bilateral negotiations. To counterbalance Makarios' 
influence, Stephanopoulos appointed General George Grivas, the former 
EOKA leader, as cornmander of the Greek forces stationed on the island. 
Grivas attacked Makarios' stand and proclaimed himself the champion of 
Enosis while keeping secret an agreement with Undersecretary of State George 
Ball in which he had consented to accept the basic thrusts of the Acheson Plan 
(Coufoudakis, 1976:283). Makarios protested and characterized Grivas' 
appointment "a great error" (Katsis, 1976:8). This prompted the resignation of 
Foreign Minister Tsirimokos. However, his successor met his Turki$h 
counterpart in December 1966 and signed a protocol agreeing "to seek ways 
which would facilitate the solution of the Cyprus problem within the general 
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framework of reiations between the two countries" (Katsis, 1976:97-98). 
Makarios' skillful opposition and the ensuing collapse of the weak 
Stephanopoulos cabinet temporarily postponed the process, but the common 
line between Athens and Nicosia was replaced by a schism regarding the 
handling of the "national question". It fell upon the military regime to continue 
and intensify the rift. 
lliE GREEK MILITARY REGIME AND THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS 
Grivas' presence on the island created a dual authority. He criticized 
Makarios for not wanting Enosis and attracted a small but vocal following to his 
"pro Enosis" stand. Grivas welcomed the coup in Athens as a positive 
dev•slopment which contrasted with Makarios' rather stoic attitude. Publicly the 
new· rulers made bombastic pro-Enosis statements. Privately, however, they 
pursued a different line. London's Daily Telegraph (July 1967) reported that 
"the Greek military see two obstacles to their 'enotic' policy. One is the 
nationalistic Cvpriot public opinion which opposes concessions, i.e., partition. 
The other hindrance is President Makarios ....." The military rulers, the report 
concluded, "characteristically leave the impression that they would not hesitate 
to clash with him" (Gregoriadis, 197.5:1:134). 
The kind of Enosis that the Colonels sought, however, was not one that 
could have come about as a result of self-determination, as Makarios argued, 
but an Enosis hammered out by the governments of Greece and Turkey. In 
short, the military regime's Cypriiot policy differed very little from that of 
Steph;:mopoulos' apostate government. Evidence of this surfaced almost 
immediately. The Foreign Ministers of ;all NATO members urged Greece and 
Turkey "J:o resume their discussions" and the two governments agreed to meet 
on September 6, 1967 to discuss the Cyprus dispute. In an effort to consolidate 
the home front, the Colonels sought to deal with the Cyprus problem quickly by 
meeting Turkish officials on .the banks of Evros River. In returnfor Enosis, the 
Greel-.;s offered concessions 11vhich the Turkish side rejected as insufficient, but 
the two sides p)edged .to continue their dialogue. 
The failure of this effortforced the Colonels to continue making pro-Enosis 
statements for domestic consumption. This led to an intensification of Grivas' 
criticism against Makarios and at the same: time angered the Turkish Cypriot 
community. Thus on November 15, 1967 fighting broke out. The National 
Guarct under the cc1mmand of Gel}eral Grivas moved in and smashed the 
Tur1dsh-Cypriot fighters . .Ankara react~d sharply to these developments and 
through President General Sunay stated that "we decided to solve the Cyprus 
problem one•~ and for all" (l;{.atsis, 1976:122). 
·yt:lrkey's threat of military action alairmed ,Johnson, who quickly dispatched 
Unde11secretary of Defl?nse Cyru.s Vance to the area to defuse the crisis. Under 
Wasbingtfm's pressure and f,earing an internal upheaval, the Colonels accepted 
Vance's recommendaJiobs 1.vhich indud~d withdrawal of all Greek forces 
clandestinely stationed on the island, dissolution of the Cypriot National 
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Guard-largely run by officers from mainland Greece, expansion of the size 
and scope of the U.N. peace-keeping contingent, and compensation by Greece 
to all Turkish Cypriots who had suffered losses as a result of the fighting. In 
addition, the Greek Government voluntarily recalled General Grivas, who had 
become an embarrassment. Archbishop Makarios, however, refused to accede 
to the dismantlement of the National Guard and to transfer police responsibility 
to UNFICYP troops. After extensive manuevering in the U.N., the Turkish 
government finally agreed to modify its position regarding these two key issues. 
By the end of 1967 the Greek forces were out and the two communities had 
agreed to engage in intercommunal talks under the auspices of the U.N. aimed 
at solving the problem from within. 
However, the intercommunal talks led nowhere and the blame for this 
failure in Athens, Ankara, and Washington was put on Makarios' intransigence. 
As early as the summer of 1971 the State Department had concluded that "the 
problem Makarios" had to be neutralized and the task "was to be essentially left 
to Greece" ( Coufoudakis, 1976:290). This is not to say that agreement had been 
reached on the method of implementation. Nonetheless, the Greek military 
rulers pursued a relentless campaign that culminated in the overthrow of the 
Archbishop in July 1974. Let us examine the events that unfolded during this 
four-year period. 
On February 21, 1970, the Soviet News Agency Tass, reported the 
existence of "a subversive plan led by reactionary Cypriot and NATO 
elements" designed to install in Cyprus "a terrorist military dictatorship of the 
Greek model," and charged responsibility for the plot to the "reactionary Greek 
officers who continue to occupy significant position in the Cypriot National 
Guard" (Katsis, 1976:135). Within a few weeks, the Soviet news agency's report 
came true. On March 8, an unsuccessful assassination attempt against 
Makarios took place. As it turned out, the plot was designed to create a climate 
conducive to a military coup. Shortly before the assassination attempt, Der 
Spiegel reported that the Cypriot government was in possession of a document 
indicating that "the plot to overthrow Makarios' government had been laid out 
in Athens" (Gregoriadis, 1975 11:121). At first, the Cypriot gov¢rnment denied 
the authenticity of the document, but later on Makarios linked Greek officers to 
the conspiracy (~Gregoriadis, 1975 11:124-125). 
The struggle between Athens and Nicosia undoubtedly strengthened the 
Turkish position but at the same time caused considerable nervousness in 
Ankara. Turkey always wanted a negotiated settlement and certainly did not 
view this quarrel as harmful to Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests. Even 
though Ankara had very little liking for Makarios and would have been more 
than pleased to see him disappear from the scene, the Turks regarded with 
suspicion any moves by the Greek officers to bring about his violent overthrow 
and replace him with a pro-Enosis regime. Seemingly, Turkey wanted to avoid a 
military confrontation with Greece that could have been precipitated in the 
event that a pro·Enosis Cypriot government actively sought union with Greece. 
However, Ankara was also concerned about gaining the support of the 
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international community. Having endorsed the U.N.'s proposal for an 
intercommunal agrrangement. as well as Washington's suggestion for a 
negotiated settlement, Turkey sought to appear in the eyes of the international 
community as a defender of recognized treaties and agreements. Thus, if 
Ankara was forced to intervene in the event of a pro-Enosis take-over in 
Cyprus, Turkey would have acted in accordance with the Treaties of Zurich and 
London which essentially gave the right to the three guarantors to act together 
or individually, if common effort was impossible, to take action with the purpose 
of reestablishing the state of affairs created by the treaty. 
In May 1971 Papadopoulos sought to pacify Turkish concerns. In an 
interview with the Turkish daily Millet he stated that the Cypriot problem must 
be worked out between Greece and Turkey, that "it should be made clear to the 
two Cypriot communities" that Greece and Turkey are not willing to disturb 
their relations, let alone fight, for their sake...", and that "if Cypriots are 
convinced that we are determined to maintain good relations, then they will 
come together and will try to reconcile their differe,nces (Papadopoulos, 1968­
1972: VI:92-95). 
Papadopoulos' conciliatory gesture seemed to have reassured Ankara. The 
Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, t.;tking advantage of NATO's Foreign 
Ministers' conference, met in Lisbon on <July 3 and 4, 1971 and worked out an 
understanding designed to serve as a bar$is for handling the Cyprus dispute 
bilaterally. The Lisbon accord included the following three poii'lts among others: 
(1) Greece accepted the London and Zurich Agreements as being in full force; 
(2) the Cypriot problem would not be discussed in the U.N. or any other 
international body, but only between Greece and Turkey; and (3) Greece 
a.greed never to advance the matter of Enosis again. Nonetheless, Soviet and 
C~,rpriot sources indicated that at the Lisbon NATO conference "a plan was 
formulated which foresaw the termination of Cypriot independence and the 
partition of the island" (Coufoudakis, 1976a:289). 
Shortlv after the Lisbon meeting, the military rulers began applying 
presSL\re Ol'l Makarios. ln m letter dated ,July 18, 1971,Papadopoulos warned the 
Archbishop to go along ~.\lith the Greek government's suggestions; otherwise 
the government "will find itself in the avvkward necessity to take those steps 
dictated by the national interests... however bitter these measures may be" 
(Kakaounakis, 1976:159-161). Within a day or two, the Foreign Ministry passed 
a compJ,ementary but confidential note to Makarios emphasizing that ". . . 
Athens, as the ethnikrm kentron (national centet), draws and plans both policy 
directions and tactics," and bluntly conclud~~d that"... the Cypriot line need be 
within and adapt to the national guideline$'' (Kakaounakis, 1976:165-16'7). In 
eff,ect,. the military regime let the Arch!Ji1SJhop know that Greece did not 
recognize th1~ existence of Cy~rus as an independent entity with the right to 
determine its own foreign policy, a ploy vJhichdear!y contradicted one of the 
fundamental. points of the public Lisbon Lm:derstanding, lending weight to the 
Soviet a1nd Cypj·iot charrg~~s that the unofficial af:J:r'eernent at Lisbon was the 
opposite of the published version. Or, to be more explicit, the Greeks had been 
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given the go-ahead to proceed as if double-Enosis had in fact taken place in 
terms of foreign policy decision making between the Greek government and 
Makarios. 
The independent -minded Archbishop would not be trapped. Responding to 
the argument that the Cypriot policy must be in conformity with that of the 
national center, Makarios stated: "I do not accept such a view, particularly 
when the Greek government repeatedly has emphasized its inability to 
undertake the military protection of Cyprus." Under the circumstances, the 
Archbishop concluded, "The Greek Cypriots must have the final word in 
anything that concerns their survival and national future" (Kakaounakis, 1976: 
II: 162-165). 
Makarios' refusal to yield to the military rulers' ultimatum angered the 
Colonels and galvanized their determination to dispense with him. For this 
purpose the regime secretly dispatched General Grivas to the island to prepare 
the ground. This time Grivas' presence on the island caused "no anxiety" to the 
Turkish side (Katisis, 1976:154), but it was to irritate and undermine Makarios' 
rule and policies. Grivas, acting as a surrogate of the Athens regime, formed a 
terrorist organization which for sentimental reasons was named EOKA-B and 
whose alleged goal was to bring about Enosis. EOKA-B and other similar gangs 
that mushroomed on the island engaged in sabotage activities against the 
government. Athens offered its semi-official blessings to these groups stating 
that there was nothing illegal about them. 
By the following February the Athens government and its surrogates in 
Cyprus, led by the Greek-ledNational Guard, appeared ready to stage a coup. 
The Cypriot government, however, got wind of the subversive plan and moved 
expeditiously to foil the plot. President Makarios informed the American 
ambassador that the Cypriots would resist the coup and that diplomatic 
representatives of other countries woul<;l also be informed. Fearing that a move 
against Makarios would embarrass the U.S. and perhaps endanger detente, the 
American ambassdor urged his superiors to dissuade the Colonels' intentions. 
Within a day this initiative bore fruit and the U.S., through Ambassador Tasca, 
"warned" Papadopoulos "against the use of violence or heavy stuff" (de 
Borchgrave, 1974:2). It appears therefore that American policymakers 
deplored the use of violence but condoned the "peaceful" removal of Makarios. 
Adhering to Washington's insistence against the use of "heavy stuff," the 
praetorian government temporarily shelved its coupist plans but not its 
sabotage efforts. At the same time the regime unleashed a diplomatic offensive 
to force Makarios' resignation. On February 2,5, 1972, Deputy Foreign Minister 
Panagiotakos delivered a memorandum to Ankara's envoy in Athens criticizing 
Makarios as an "unstable character" and a "liar," and concluded, that 
"cooperation between Athens and Nicosia is not possible as long as Makarios 
remains president of the Cypriot Republic" (Katsis, 1976:appendix). In essence, 
tJ-le Greek government formally sought Turkey's assistance to remove the 
Archbishop from power. Turkish authorities seemed prepared to cooperate. 
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Prime Minister Nihat Erim stated that "Greece and Turkey wish to arrange this 
problem (meaning Cyprus) ... (but) Makarios is capable enought to create 
difficulties for the two countries" (Katsis 1976:194-196). London's Daily 
Telegraph, on March 28, 1972, evaluated the emerging common front against 
Makarios saying that "Greece and Turkey have decided that peace in Cyprus 
can be possible only when Makarios has left rhe scene... " and added, "there are 
not indications that America and Britain have come to a similar conclusion ..." 
1(Katsis, 1976: 195-196). 
Thus, a new offensive against the Archbishop got underway and took the 
form of pressure from within. Calls for his resignation came from the leadership 
of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Cyprus. Following the 
recommendation of the Greek government, three bishops delivered an 
ultimaturn to Makarios demanding his resignation as president on the grounds 
that under church law an Archbishop should not hold temporal power. 
Makarios refused to comply and the bishops proceeded to defrock him. With 
popular support behind him he went on the offensive. He invited the Supreme 
Synod, consisting of Orthodox Patriarchs, to judge whether he had violated 
canon law. The Synod met in June 1973, cleared Makarios, and moved to 
condemn and defrock his three antagonists (Markides, 1977:108-112). Through 
the use of shrewd political maneuverings Makarios survived another crisis 
emanating from within the most powedul social force in Cyprus, the Orthodox 
church. The failure of these efforts to unseat the Archbishop prompted the 
Athens regime to re-employ violence. But "Plan Apollo," as the latest plot 
became known, was never carried out because the Cypriot intelligence 
uncovered the plot in August 1973, and foiled it before it had a chance to 
blossom. 
With the failure of Apollo time ran out on Papadopoulos. In November 
1973, the hardliners led by security chief Ioannidis, toJ)pled Papadopoulos for, 
as they put it, he had "failed to realize the goals of the April21, 1967 Revolution .. 
. " i(Gregoriadis, 1975:IU:l31). Having said that, however, the military tacitly 
admitted the failure of their regime. Within a few weeks it became apparent that 
the new gO\:,ernment had nothing new to offer and lacked any sense of direciton 
and vii:alit!/· As economic and political problems worsened, so did the 
government's ability to cope with them. Only a national crisis could have saved 
the ne1;v regime. Shortly after Joannidis' ascent to power Grivas di·ed, and his 
death gave the new strongman far greater control over the activities of EOKA­
B. In f,abruary, supported by Athens, EOKAB set in motion an alii-out effort 
against the Archbishop. 
Howev<er, the discovery of oil deposits in the Aegean reactivated the Greco­
Turkish Copflict. This ;:liong witp ioannidis' apparent failure to reassure Turkish 
authorities further exacerbated Ankara's .anxieties. At the same time, Cyprus 
present.ed an opportupit)l to the weak coa!lition government of Bulent Ecevit to 
strengthen its political standing. One or perhaps a combination of the following 
consideratipn.s seem to have shaped the thinking of the Greek military rulers in 
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their decision to stage a coup against the Cypriot leader: removing Makarios 
from the scene would not meet with American opposition; Makarios' removal 
would pave the way for double-Enosis which would have been sold domestically 
as Enosis with minor adjustments; Turkey would accept anyone as Makarios' 
replacement; Ioannidis and his colleagues had become contemptuous of the 
Cypriots higher standard of living and lifestyle and detested the legal status that 
the Communist Party (AKEL) enjoyed; finally, like their civilian counterparts, 
they believed that the Cypriots must follow the decisions of the ethnikon 
kentron regarding the handling of the national question. 
The Archbishop and his associates sensed that a new coup was in the offing 
and once again sought to neutralize it. Cyprus' envoy to Washington was 
instructed to ask American officials to exert pressure on the military rulers to 
change their plans. Ambassador Dimitriou called on the State Department and 
reportedly stated "that a serious effo_rt will be made to assassinate Archbishop 
Makarios..."(Stern, 1977:94). Despite the flurry of diplomatic cables indicating 
that a military coup was imminent, "Foggy Bottom" adhered to Kissinger's 
instructions to avoid meddling in the internal policies of the Athens regime and 
to give primacy to the national security relationship between Washington and 
Athens (U.S. Intelligence, 1975). 
Washington's latest attitude did not seem to reflect a change of heart. 
Makarios was still considered the stumbling block toward solving the Cyprus 
dispute within the framework of the Western Alliance. United States 
policymakers wished to see the Archbishop removed but, as previously, 
opposed his removal by force. The failure of the State Department, to dissuade 
Joannidis against the use of "heavy stuff," as the United States had done before, 
stems from what appeared to have been an intelligence failure. In fact, it was 
said that the latest report that the State Department received hours before the 
coup indicated that "Joannidis ... impressed by the arguments against violence . 
. . was cooling off on his coup intentions ..."(Stern, 1975:55). In the light of these 
murky conditions, the State Department downplayed Ambassador 
Dimitrious's warnings as unconfirmed rumors-a position echoed by Secretary 
Kissinger's statement shortly after the coup that "the information was not 
exactly lying around on the. streets" (Stern, 1975:55). 
Despite the general calmness about Cyprus in the State Department, there 
was a dissenting voice, that of Q;rprus Country Director Thomas Boyatt, who 
repeatedljj warned his superiors of an imminent move against Makarios (Stern, 
1975:46-50). The higher echelons of the State Department initially ignored 
Boyatt'sreport but eventually im;tructed Ambassador Tasca to warn the Greek 
government against the use of violence. Tasca contacted Prime Minister 
Androutsopoulos and expressed U.S. disapproval of violence. But the 
American ambassador refused to see Brigadier General Joannidis, the real 
holder of power, whom he dismissed as "a cop" that "you do not make 
diplomatic demarches to" (de Borchgrave, 1974:34). But while Tasca was being 
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reassured by the "official" Greek government that there was nothing in the 
offing, the de facto ruler, General Ioannidis, held repeated meetings with CIA 
officials who apparently led him to believe that Washington would approve of his 
plans to move against Makarios (Stern, 1976). Ioannidis' statement months 
after the July coup that "if you knew what I knew you would have done the same 
thing" provides evidence suggesting that the State Department and the CIA 
pursued contradictory policies regarding the Cyprus issue. 
Sensing that diplomatic efforts were producing no results, Makarios 
decided to abandon his wait-and-see tactics and went on the offensive. On July 
2, 1974, he sent a non-confidential letter to Greek President General Gizikis 
openly charging that '"members of the military regime of Greece support and 
direct the terrorist activities of EOKA-B and the involvement of Greek officers 
of lthe National Guard in unlawful acts of conspiracy and other inadmissible 
conducts." Heminding the Greek. rulers that he was not its "appointed 
perfect ... but the elected leader," Makarios demanded the immediate "recall of 
all Greek officers serving in the National Guard..." (Gregoriadis, 1975: III:l69­
173). The Archbishop's lett,er did not change Ioannidis' intentions. The muzzled 
mass media in Greece mentioned nothing about MiJ.karios' letter. Instead, the 
government unleashed an angry anti-Makarios campaign. The stage was now 
set. On July 15, 1974, the National G~ard moved against the presidential palace. 
Makarios was overthrovm but not physically eliminated as the miliitary rulers 
had hoped. Nonetheless, a pro-Enosi.s terrorist, Nicos Sampson, was sworn in 
as President of Cyprus. 
The military government of Athens moved quickly to deny any involvement 
stn"ssing that the coup in Cyprus was an internal affair of the Cypriot republic. 
But the Turkish government and the Turkish-Cypriots would not have any of 
that and reacted sharply to the news of the coup. Prime Minister Ecevit of 
Turkey characterized the overthrow of Mak.arios as a violation of the "Treaty of 
Guarantee" and on J·uly 19 stressed that "the crisis is of large dimensions and 
Turkey's patience is small" (New York Times, 1974). Turkey's long awaited 
opportunity bad finally come. Brushing a1.vav Assistant Secretary of State 
Joseph Sisco's plea to exercise restraint and using: the Treaty of Guarantee as 
legal justification, Turkey invaded the island by force. 
Turkey's invasion prompted the "uniformed and incompetent" Ioannidis 
and his equaUy impotent "civilian ministers," as Ambassador Tasca described 
them (de Borchgrave, 1974:34), to order g,eneral mobilization and prepared to 
declqre war against the perennial enemy to the east. The declaration of a 
national emergency, however, aut~::m1.atically brought about the reinstatement 
of hierarchical command in the military. Th,e hitherto docile. commanders of the 
three services (army, air force, navy), ;:~nd th.e Chief ofthe Armed Forces, were 
suddenly faced with either making decisions or implementing those made by 
their subordinate, i.e,, Brigqdier Ioanniai$. In their July 22 meeting the three 
commmanders inforrned. the Chief of the Armed Forces that their respective 
services were not prepared for 1.-var.. Then the four generals proceeded to 
remove Ioannidis and to call back the old politicaUeaders to "save" the country. 
Following intensive deliberation, former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis 
was invited from his self-imposed exile. to form a civilian. government. Makarios 
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survived the coup and eventually returned to power and the military returned to 
the barracks, thus terminating almost seven years of praetorian rule. 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY REGIME'S CYPRUS POLICY 
On the surface, the Cypriot policy of the apostates government and that of 
the military regime seem to have one thing in common: both appeared prepared 
to solve the "national question" through bilateral negotiations with Turkey-a 
strategy that Markarios consistently rejected. A closer look, however, reveals 
that while the Stephanopoulos cabinet indicated willingness to accept a 
compromise solution involving the exchange of territories without necessarily 
carving up the island, the praetorian regime, despite its bombastic pro-Enosis 
public pronouncements, seemed determined to proceed with a solution that 
would have culminated in double Enosis i.e., partition. The pro-junta Salonika 
daily, Ellinikos Vorras, most tactfully expressed the military rulers' thinking 
regarding the Cyprus problem: "Because we are realists," the editorial 
contended, "since no other more favorable solution is possible, our first and last 
concession is double Enosis with 80 percent of Cyprus to Greece and 20 
percent to Turkey." And the author rhetorically concluded: "Why was the kind 
of solution possible in Thrace and not in Cyprus?" (Katsis, 1976:160). Double 
Enosis in effect, had been the praetorians' Cypriot policy. But why were the 
military rulers of Greece, known for their nationalism, pursuing a policy that 
went contrary to the very thrust of the "Megali ldea"?3 The answer to this 
question can be sought by examining the reasons underlying America's, and by 
implication NATO's, posture regarding Cyprus and by exploring the Greek 
military's relationship with and attitud~s toward the U.S. and the North Atlantic 
Alliance. 
The recovery of vast oil deposits in the Fertile Crescent coupled with the 
rise of nationalism in the area and the establishment of Israel propelled the 
Middle East to the forefront of the rivalry between the forces of communism and 
democracy. The 1956 Suez crisis and the ensuing cooling-off in the relations 
between the U.S. and Egypt (largely as a result of Secretary Dulles' refusal to 
commit American assistance in the building of the As wan Dam), as well as leftist 
inspired coups in Iraq and Syria increased the strategic importance of Cyprus. 
The once commercial refueling station became an important observation point 
paramount to the strategic interests of the U.S. and the North Atlantic 
community. At no other time did America desire more to "keep the Soviet 
Union . . . from gaini~ some foothold in Cyprus as an ally of Archbishop 
Makarios or through the Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) which generally 
supported Makarios" than in the years following the Six Day War of July 1967 
(Campbell, 1976:14). The increasingly viable presence of the Soviet fleet in the 
Mediterranean and the expansion of Russian influence in the Middle East 
coupled with the rise of power of Middof in Malta, and the loss of home-porting 
galvanized American and NATO determination to bring the Cyprus dispute to a 
close (Coufoudakis, 1976a:287). It was within this context that American policy 
3 Megali Idea (Great Idea) referred to a policy designed for the redemption of the former 
Byzantine territories and the establishment of a greater Greece. 
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makers, from President Johnson on, applied increasing pressure on Greece 
and Turkey to solve the Cyprus question on the basis of bilateral negotiations 
guided by the famous/infamous Acheson Plan. 
The "Castro of the Mediterranean," as Makarios was referred to in high 
policy circles in Washington, had repeatedly frustrated American aims to have 
the Cyprus problem solved within NATO. Consequently, the Cypriot leader 
was seen as too unreliable for American tastes and harmful to the Atlantic 
Alliance's strategic goals. At the same time, the continuing existence of the 
Cyprus issue had become an irritant in the relations between Greece and 
Turkey (both members of NATO's southern flank) and was seen in Washington 
as "a bleeding ulcer" that had to be eradicated (Campbell, 1976:15). The 
thoroughly anti-communist Greek military shared Washington's apprehensions 
toward Makarios' neutralist stands and fully subscribed to the North Atlantic 
community's fear of Soviet infiltration and eventual domination of the 
Mediterranean basin and the oil-rich Middle East. It is also reasonable to assume 
that the Greek military believed that 1..1Jithout American and NATO support the 
goal of keeping the Soviets out of the area could not be accomplished. Thus, as 
a result of ideological congruencies reinforce:d by professional responsibilities to 
protect their client-the Greek state-the Greek military maintained a close, if 
not a cordial relationship with the U.S. and the North Atlantic Alliance since 
1951 when Greece joined NATO. 
This close relationship was based not on common ideological grounds 
alone, but on substa.ntive actions as \Mel!. As table 1 indicates, NATO countries 
and particularly the U.S. became Greece's alm~lst exclusive arms suppliers. 
Moreover, the Americans through the Truman Doctrine rushed to provide 
assistance to t!-1~ Greek military in their battle against the communist insurgents 
during the critical stag1~s of the Greek Civil War (1946-1949). Such aid 
continued to flow in during the ensuing ~H::Jars as part of American economic and 
militatv aid programs authorized by the U.S. Con:gress in the 1950's and 1960's. 
For a country the .size of Greece, American aid amounted to a respectable 
Table 1 
GREECE'S 	 ARMS SUPPLIES 
SUPPLIER 
Year Total Valu~a ~- Franc~ U.K. G.F.R. Italy Canada Otherb 
1964-73 94,1 792 42 98 9 
19?4-78 1,700 1,100 380 20 110 so 10 30 
SOURCE: 	 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, u.s. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 1963-1973 and 1969-1978. 
a--millions of U.S. Dollars 

b--not including Warsaw Pact Nations 
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portion of the defense budget, thus providing in:!petus to the argument that the 
Hellenic Armed Forces had become a "penetrated" institution. 
In addition to monetary aid the Greek military benefited professionally by 
participation in common NATO exercises and postgraduate training in 
western-mainly American-military schools. During the years from 1950 to 
1969, it is estimated that 11,229 officers of the Hellenic Armed Forces received 
postgraduate training "in the dogmatically anti-communist" corps, which 
approximated 11,000 men, the ratio "assume(d) considerable significance" 
(Couloumbis, 1976:126). Additional evidence further illustrates the close 
relationship between the Greek military and the North Atlantic alliance. For 
example, it was estimated that in 1971 77 percent of the navy officers, followed 
by 43 percent of the air force and 34 percent of the army, possessed proficiency 
in one or more foreign-mainly western-languages with English by far the 
most widely spoken (Kourvetaris, 1976:135). 
This close relationship is said to have been one of the causes of the 1967 
intervention. Upon assuming power, the Greek military announced that they 
did so in order to forestall a communist takeover which, among other things, 
would have disrupted Greece's links with NATO-an agreement supported by 
a small but vocal number of academics (Kousoulas, 1969). Papadopoulos lost 
no time in stressing the importance of the North Atlantic Alliance committed to 
"the preservation of peace and the defense of the strides of the western 
civilization which are constantly threatened by totalitarianism" (Papadopoulos, 
1968:III:77). 
The results of my survey questionnaire lend additional supportive evidence 
regarding the attitudes of the Greek military toward NATO and the U.S. In very 
high percentage the responding officers indicated that NATO has been 
beneficial to world peace and that Greece's membership in it has kept the 
country out of communist danger. An equally high number of the officers felt 
that Greece could not have defended herself without NATO, and regarded the 
country's continuous participation in it as vital to its present and future security 
interests. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the respondents (evenly 
distributed across the three services) indicated that Greece's membership in 
the North Atlantic Alliance has been very valuable to their professional 
interests, as has the postgraduate training they received in the Naval 
Postgraduate School which almost unanimously they regard as superior to its 
counterparts in their homeland. Almost all of the responding officers agree that 
Greece's membership in NATO has improved the training and general 
capabilities of the Hellenic Armed Forces, and at the same time they recognized 
the need for the U.S. as the leading non-communist power to play a prominent 
role in formulating and implementing the organization's strategies. The same 
officers view American participation in NATO as almost indispensable. With 
respect to the relationship between the foreign policy objectives of countries 
belonging to defense alliances of the NATO type, two-thirds of the respondents 
expressed the opinion that member-states should adopt foreign policies that are 
in basic agreement with the fundamental goals and intentions of the 
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organizcLtion, even if they are not in complete harmony with the national 
aspirations of the member-state. Finally, without exception the respondents felt 
that Greece had been a very faithful partner in the North Atlantic defense 
community. 
The overwhelmingly positive attitudes of the Greek military regarding 
NATO and the U.S. contrast sharply with anti-American and anti-NATO 
sentiments prevalent in the Greek press during the years following the 1974 
Cyprus crisis. For example, Carmocolias found the attitude of the Athens press 
toward the U.S. and NATO to be "critical." This uniform stance, he observes, 
"is especially noteworth~~ in a press system where dailies (newspapers) often 
adopt diametrically opposed views and provide fundamentally different 
interpretations to public affairs depending on political party affiliation" 
(1981:229). 
The preceding analysis provides evidence suggesting th<.tt the U.S. sought 
an ;;mang(~ment of the Cyprus dispute within NATO, fearing that any other 
solution outside the North Atlantic framework would compromise the strategic 
interests of the West. The data also demonstrates a very close relationship 
between the Greek military and the NATO defense community exemplified by 
the very postive attitudes on the part of the Greek officers toward both the U.S. 
and NATO. Onthe basis of these, then, one can argue that the Greek militar~l­
due to professional needs such as arms, training, and general support-became 
highly dependent on the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance and 
actively pursued a U.S.-NATO desired solution to the Cyprus problem even 
though such a posture seemed to compromise the national aspirations of the 
GrE~ek state whose interests the military swore to defend. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this paper h;:;Ls been to examine the impact of alliance oriented 
professionalism on the behavior of the military of member states of defense 
alliances. This paper looked at the Cyprus questiot:l and its handling by the 
Greek praetorian regime that culminated in the debacle of July 1974, as a result 
of which Turkish military forces occupied a significant portion of the island. 
It appears that the North Atlantic community and its leading member the 
U.S. sought to solve the Cypriot dispute within the confines of the alliance. 
American and NATO policy makers ex,erted considerable pressure on the 
predominantly civilian Greek cabinets (from the early 1950's to 1966) to accept 
a NATO sponsored solution to the problem. The data revealed that on the 
whole, albeit eager to compromise and at least partially accept Western 
proposals designed to solve the Cyprus question within NATO, these civilian 
cabinets consistently rejected advances involving partition of the island in 
Greek and Turkish sectors-an approach long advocated by Turkey. The 
praetorian regime on the other hand was prepared to accept such a solution 
and, in fact, actively pursued a policy designed to b!'ing about double Enosis 
while making bombastic public statements for Enosis. 
What appeared to be a contradiction betvveen the private and public aims of 
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the Greek military rulers in fact seemed to have been an unconscious but 
nonetheless classic case of confusion between the interests of their client, the 
Greek state, and those of the North Atlantic alliance. In pursuing a long held 
NATO goal to solve the Cyprus problem through a bilateral agreement between 
Greece and Turkey, the Colonels apparently had come to believe that such a 
solution would have meant the union of a part of Cyprus with mother Greece. 
They felt this would have satisfied the objectives of Greece and the Greek 
Cypriots. In short, the Greek military saw no distinction between Enosis and 
partition and viewed Makarios' opposition to such plans as an anti-enotic 
obstacle that had to be liquidated. 
This apparent confusion cannot be said to have been the result of 
accidental misinterpretations of aims and events surrounding the Cyprus 
quagmire. Instead, as the foregoing analysis indicates, it is the result of the 
regime's handling of the close relationship between the Greek military and the 
North Atlantic alliance. Faced with a real or perceived communist threat the 
Greek military saw in NATO the only party willing and able to provide them with 
the necessary assistance and support to accomplish their professional mission. 
As the date reveals, the Greek military perceived the existence of NATO as 
paramount and identified the survival of their client, the Greek state, (and by 
implication their own organization) with the goals and well being of the North 
Atlantic alliance. Since Western policy makers perceived that a solution of the 
Cyprus problem within NATO would eradicate the organization's bleeding 
ulcer, the Greek military rulers appeared prepared to assist them to bring such 
a solution about seemingly believing that this would also be in the best interests 
of their profession and their country. . 
In sum, the findings of this paper support the position that aspects of 
professionalism lead the military to confuse the interests of defense alliances to 
which they belong with the national interests of their own country. Recent 
developments in Poland where the military of that nation adhering to the 
U.S.S.R. -Warsaw Pact line moved to crush the Solidarity movement also 
appear to substantiate this thesis. 
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